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Judiciary Panel 
Paradoxes in the Revolution of the Rule of Law 
Ruti Teitelt 
Perhaps it is in the nature of "velvet revolutions" that their rough 
undersides are revealed in public forums, such as courts of law, where 
debates rage about the normative content of changed political systems. In 
Eastern and Central Europe, courts are now defining the powers of new 
regimes committed to the rule of law. One of the most difficult issues faced 
by these courts is how to maintain a commitment to the rule of law while 
serving the principles of substantive justice. In an attempt to reconcile these 
competing interests, courts have, in effect, continued "revolutions" within the 
framework of the law. 
We can best understand this "paradox of the revolution of the rule of 
law," as it has been called, 1 by looking to examples. In this paper, I explore 
the dilemmas recently confronted by post-Communist transitional governments 
in Eastern and Central Europe in considering the prosecution of those who 
perpetrated crimes with the approval of previous regimes. Their dilemma is 
a familiar one; it arose in the Nuremberg trials following World War II and, 
before that, in the trials of kings in eighteenth-century transitions. 
Two court cases highlight the dilemma. The first is the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court's consideration of the Zetenyi Law ,2 which would have 
allowed prosecutions for treason and murder related to the brutal suppression 
of the 1956 coup attempt. 3 The second is a "border guards" case, heard by 
the Berlin Trial Court, which involved the prosecution of several guards for 
shootings at the Berlin Wall. 4 Both cases involve weighty symbols of freedom 
and repression: 1956 is thought of as the founding year of Hungary's 
revolution, while the Berlin Wall and its collapse were the central symbols of 
t Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; J.D. 1980, Cornell Law School. This paper 
is part of a much larger work in progress on the role of law during periods of radical political change. The 
author is indebted to the United States Institute of Peace for a generous research grant in 1992-93. A 
version of this paper was presented at the University of Michigan Law School on November 5, 1993. 
1. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. 77, pt. V(5) (Hung.) (unofficial translation on file with 
author). 
2. Law on the Right to Prosecute Serious Criminal Offenses Committed Between Dec. 21, 1944 and 
May 2, 1990 That Had Not Been Prosecuted for Political Reasons, Nov. 4, 1991 [hereinafter Zetenyi 
Law]. 
3. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. pt. 1(1). For another discussion of the Zetenyi Law 
case, see Forum, Dilemmas of Justice, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Summer 1992, at 17. 
4. Judgment of Jan. 1, 1992, LG [Trial Court] (Berlin). (523) 2 Js 48/90 (9/91), reprinted in 47 
JURISTEN ZEITUNG 691 (1992) [hereinafter Border Guards Case]. For a discussion of other "border 
guards" cases, see Jorg Arnold & Martin Kiihl, Forum: Probleme der Strajbarlceit von "Mauerschatzen, • 
32 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 991 (1992). 
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Soviet domination and its demise. Both cases also illustrate the problems 
involved in attempting to effect substantial change in a society through and 
within the law. Any resolution of the paradox is not merely a matter of 
jurisprudential interest, but one that could have political implications wherever 
transitions similar to those in Eastern and Central Europe take place. 
I. RULE OF LAW IN HUNGARY AND UNIFIED GERMANY 
In 1991, Hungary's Parliament passed the Zetenyi Law,5 which autho-
rized the lifting of statutes of limitations for treason, premeditated murder, 
and aggravated assault. The law, in effect, allowed prosecutions for crimes 
committed in suppressing the 1956 revolution, among other grave crimes of 
the past. In a landmark opinion, the Hungarian Constitutional Court held the 
law unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that, under the newly amended 
Hungarian Constitution, the rule-of-law principle of prospectivity in 
lawmaking overrode any ex post attempt to extend the statute of limitations, 
even if the worst offenses would thereby go unpunished. 6 
The opinion begins with a statement of the Court's perception of its 
dilemma: "The Constitutional Court is the repository of the paradox of the 
'revolution of the rule of law."' 7 Rule of law, the Constitutional Court 
asserted, means "predictability and foreseeability. "8 Furthermore, 
certainty of the law demands of the state, and primarily the legislature, that the whole of 
the law ••• be clear, unambiguous, its impact predictable and its consequences foreseeable 
by those whom the laws address. From the principle of predictability and foreseeability, the 
criminal law's prohibition of the use of retroactive legislation, especially ex post facto 
legislation ••• directly follows •••• Only by following formalized legal procedures can 
there be valid law, only by adherence to procedural norms can the administration of justice 
operate constitutionally •9 
According to the Court, the basic principle of the rule of law is "certainty of 
the law. "10 This basic principle is juxtaposed against the principle of 
substantive justice implied in the law. For the court, however, "[t]he certainty 
of the law based on formal and objective principles is more important than 
necessarily partial and subjective justice. "11 The choices seemed irreconcil-
able. 
5. Zetenyi Law, supra note 2. 
6. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1991, 1992/11 ABH. pt. V(l). 
7. Id. pt. Ill(4). Rule of law is unfortunately nowhere defined in the Constitution, although one 
related term is included:jogallam, which is translated as the promise of a "rule of law" or "constitutional" 
state. This term has no exact equivalent in English but has also been translated as Rechtsstaar. Id. pt. 1(2) 
n.1. In the Zetenyi case the court declared that the content of the Constitution's Rechtsstaar mandate is to 
be determined by the judiciary. Id. pt. III(2). 
8. Id. pt. IV(l). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. pt. 111(5). 
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In a newly unified Germany, the trial of the border guards for shootings 
at the Berlin Wall offers another illustration of the dilemma. The Border 
Protections Law of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
authorized soldiers ·to shoot in response to "act[s] of unlawful border 
crossing. "12 Such acts were very broadly defined and included border 
crossings attempted by two people together or those committed with 
"particular intensity." The custom at the border was to enforce the law 
strictly: supervisors emphasized that "a breach of the border should be 
prevented at all costs. "13 
In determining whether the GDR law provides border guards a defense 
against the charges, the Berlin Trial Court acknowledged the rule-of-
law/justice dilemma: 
In analyzing the question of whether it is permissible to threaten with death a person who 
does not want to abide by the exit prohibition and - disregarding it - wants to cross the 
border, and whether, if necessary, it is permissible to kill him, we are confronted with the 
question of whether everything is just that was formally, or through interpretation, 
considered to be a law. 14 
The tension between the "formal" and the "just" is at the heart of the 
problem. Holding the border guards accountable, the court rejected defenses 
based on the law as written: 
The basic principle that an act can be punished only if punishability was determined by law 
before the act was committed ••• does not hinder punishment in this case •••• Justice and 
humanity were portrayed as ideals also in the then GDR. In general, adequate ideas as to 
the basis of natural justice were indeed disseminated.15 
The court relied on precedents of the Federal Constitutional Court elevating 
the principle of material justice over the principle of the certainty of the law 
in certain circumstances.16 Thus, the Hungarian and German courts formulat-
ed the dilemma in a similar manner, but came down on opposite sides: the 
Hungarian court interpreted the rule of law to require certainty, whereas the 
Berlin court interpreted it to require substantive justice. 
The dilemma of successor justice faced by the Hungarian and German 
courts forms part of a rich dialogue on the nature of law. H.L.A. Hart and 
Lon Fuller's debate on transitional justice wrestles with the relationship 
between law and morality, between positivism and natural law. 17 Fuller 
rejected Hart's abstract formulation of the problem, and instead focused on 
postwar Germany. The "true nature of the dilemma confronted by Germany 
12. Border Guards Case, supra note 4, at 692. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 694-95. 
16. Id. at 693 (citing 3 BVerGE 232 (1953)). 
17. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958) [hereinafter Fuller, Reply]. 
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in seeking to rebuild her shattered legal institutions," he wrote, was "to 
restore both respect for law and respect for justice. . . . [P]ainful antinomies 
were encountered in attempting to restore both at once . . . . "18 In a now 
well-known hypothetical, The Problem of the Grudge Informer, Fuller 
questioned whether a new government can bring a collaborator to justice if 
doing so would necessitate tampering with the laws in effect at the time when 
the acts were committed. 19 Arguing that Hart's opposition to selective 
tampering elevates rule-of-law considerations over those of substantive 
criminal justice, Fuller justified selective tampering to preserve the morality 
of the law. 
Contemporary scholarly analyses of the nature of the rule of law such as 
Ronald Dworkin' s perpetuate antinomic conceptions of the rule of law. 
Dworkin speaks of a "rule book" conception, which emphasizes procedural 
protections, such as prospectivity of law, and the "rights" conception, which 
demands recognition of moral and political rights in positive law and does not 
distinguish between procedural and substantive justice. 20 To the extent that 
Dworkin's analysis sets forth competing procedural and substantive visions, 
the dilemma implicitly remains.21 
The Hungarian and German cases may illuminate scholarly analysis of 
this important problem, but they leave the debate exactly as it was: a clash of 
two absolutes. Pushing the analysis further requires a better understanding of 
the values served by the rule of law. Moving outside the antinomies of law 
and morality, law and discretion, law and justice, rules and rights, means 
thinking about how to reconcile a variety of justice values. 
The judges in the two cases in question saw the problem as the pursuit of 
successor justice threatening certainty of the law. Their approach suggests that 
"procedural justice" has become detached from a more substantive under-
standing of the rule of law. Yet what is the independent content of the 
principle of prospectivity? How are we to make sense of a commitment to 
these principles separated from some other rule-of-law ideal? Were the two 
always in tension? Or was there a time when the prospectivity principle could 
not be understood apart from the principle of substantive justice? 
The antinomic formulation of the rule-of-law/justice dilemma in cases and 
scholarly works results from a distorted view of the rule of law that has 
developed over time. Re-situating the dilemma in a historical and political 
context yields a different understanding of the rule of law. The concept of the 
rule of law developed in ancient Greece in response to tyranny. The Greeks 
contrasted tyranny with "isonomy," an early conception of the rule of law 
meaning "equal law for the bad and the good. "22 In the Greek view, the rule 
18. Fuller, Reply, supra note 17, at 657. 
19. See LON L. Fu!.LER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 187 (1964) [hereinafter FULLER, MORALITY]. 
20. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRlNCIPLE 11-12 (1985). 
21. Id. at 12-13. 
22. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUI10N OF LIBERTY 162-75 (1960) (tracing origins of rule 
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of law is best understood by contrasting it with rule by man. 23 How is it that 
the early view of the rule of law as equal justice, a view that originated in a 
societal response to tyranny, has given way to the contemporary view of an 
insolvable dilemma between justice and the rule of law? Where is the link 
between the rule-of-law principle of equal justice and the rule-of-law principle 
of prospectivity? The prospectivity principle, I argue, developed in order to 
help realize the equal-justice ideal. Seen against a backdrop of tyranny, 
prospectivity is critical to the rule of law. 
In a democracy, a prospectivity requirement can be viewed as a way to 
make operational a principle of equal justice. The Greeks viewed majority 
lawmaking as a way to promote equal treatment under the law. 24 But the 
tyranny or unequal-justice problem is not entirely remedied by democratic 
lawmaking; a majority may still tyrannize a minority. Here, a role for 
prospectivity arises: prospectivity is not an autonomous rule-of-law ideal, but 
rather a constraint designed to promote the rule of law understood as equal 
justice. 
II. THE SEARCH FOR NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 
Probing the legal rhetoric of the Hungarian and German cases leads to a 
different explanation for the decisions involved. By framing the rule-of-
law/justice dilemmas as ex post facto problems in ordinary constitutional 
times, the opinions avoid addressing the larger question of the authority of a 
transitional judiciary to decide the extent of legal continuity of a prior regime. 
What is the role of the judge and of judicial review where the regime itself, 
and not merely one piece oflegislation, is of questionable legitimacy? To what 
extent are the questions confronted by the Berlin and Hungarian courts 
appropriate questions for the judiciary? Should they not instead be part of a 
vital political debate? 
Returning first to the Berlin court in the border guards case, to what 
extent did acceptance or rejection of the guards' defenses imply evaluation of 
the validity of the past legal regime? According to the Unification Treaty, acts 
that took place prior to the treaty are subject to the provisions of the GDR's 
former criminal code.25 The Berlin court rejected the guards' defenses, even 
though they were grounded in prior law, and thus apparently ignored the 
Treaty's command.26 The court, however, was guided by past decisions 
concerning the Nazi regime. Relying on a doctrine established in a 1953 
of law). 
23. See ARISTOTLE, THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 52 (P.J. Rhodes trans., 1984). On "isonomy,. 
see HAYEK, supra note 22, at 164-65. 
24. ARISTOTLE, THE Pourrcs 225-26 (TrevorJ. Saunders ed. & T .A. Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 1981). 
25. Border Guards Case, supra note 4, at 691. 
26. Id. at 693-95. 
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decision distinguishing positive law from justice, the court asserted, "The 
experience of the National Socialist regime in Germany, in particular, has 
taught that . . . it must be possible in extreme cases to value the principle of 
material justice more highly than the principle of the certainty of the law. 1127 
This response to World War II injustice constrains judicial decisionmaking in 
contemporary post-Communist controversies in unified Germany. The court's 
reference to 11 extreme cases 11 appears to equate the crimes of the national 
socialist period with the actions taken during the Communist period. 28 
The Court's attempt to link its decision to the post-Nazi rule-of-law 
dilemma, however, cannot obscure the differences between the post-Nazi and 
present-day cases. In post-Nazi Germany, achieving the rule of law as equal 
justice, appeared to collide with achieving the rule of law as procedural 
regularity. In postwar Germany, legal institutions had no legitimacy. 
Simultaneously restoring society's confidence in law and in justice required 
some degree of compromise. 
The post-Nazi dilemma does not arise in post-Communist Germany. East 
Germany was incorporated into a fully functioning legal order; in post-Nazi 
Germany, no such order existed. To the extent that the legal continuity 
problem arises at all in the border guards cases, it does so on a much smaller 
scale than in other post-Communist transitions. Thus, for example, in 
assuming the power to reject defenses based on past law, the Berlin court does 
not usurp the power of other political branches. Despite the Court's 
characterization of its dilemma, it did not bear the burden of restoring the rule 
of law. 
Turning to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the rule-of-law paradox 
can be better understood as a rhetorical device enabling the court to avoid 
explicitly addressing the related question of the extent of legal continuity with 
the prior regime. The court's conclusion that the Zetenyi Law was unconstitu-
tional appears questionable when one considers that the amended Constitution 
lacked an express provision against ex post facto laws. The mandate for the 
rule of law is derived from one word in the Constitution: jogallam. 29 It is 
from this one word, alternatively interpreted as promising a "rule of law" or 
11constitutional11 state, that the court construed a mandate to prohibit the 
Parliament's revival of time-barred causes of action. In elevating the ex post 
facto principle above equal justice under the law, the court employed a 
formalist approach to halt Parliament's efforts to make perpetrators from 
previous regimes criminally accountable. This approach enables the court to 
operate in a counterrevolutionary fashion while increasing judicial power. In 
effect, the statute-of-limitations decision represents a controversial power grab 
27. Id. at 693 (citing 3 BVerGE 232 (1953)) (author's translation). 
28. Id. 
29. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992111 ABH. pt. 1(2). 
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by the court. It is a brilliant power grab in that it appears to represent a 
victory for the rule of law. 
The question of legal continuity with the prior regime, so deftly skirted 
by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, lies at the heart of Fuller's hypothe-
tical.30 Fuller offers some possible solutions: absolute legal continuity, 
absolute discontinuity, and selective discontinuity. The Hungarian Parliament, 
in effect, chose the route of selective discontinuity in the statute-of-limitations 
law. 31 The Constitutional Court, however, ultimately denied Parliament the 
power to make this choice, striking down the law. In a profound challenge to 
Parliament's authority, the court limited Parliament's power to interpret the 
prior legal order and held that full continuity is required by the rule of law: 
"Certainty of the law demands ... the protection of rights previously 
conferred. "32 It characterized Parliament's choice of selective discontinuity 
as a challenge to the legality of the new legal order: 
With respect to its validity, there is no distinction between "pre-constitution" and "post-
constitution" law. The legitimacy of the different [political] systems during the past half 
century is a matter of indifference •••• From the viewpoint of the constitutionality of laws 
it does not comprise a meaningful category.33 
The court justified its rejection of Parliament's selective discontinuity proposal 
on the basis of rule-of-law principles. Yet the court's emphasis on certainty 
of the law masked its own interpretive leaps and exercise of discretion. 
Focusing exclusively on the content of the concept of the rule of law 
ignores the question of which governmental institutions should have the power 
to define its parameters. Does the power properly lie with the court or with 
Parliament? In its decision on the Zetenyi Law, the court asserted itself as the 
exclusive interpreter of the Constitution, and more broadly of the constitu-
tional regime. Following this holding, the full burden of evaluating the past 
legal order lies on the court. The court's assertion of exclusive interpretive 
power is highly problematic; in a constitutional democracy, understandings of 
legality and constitutionality are best promoted not by judicial monopoly over 
constitutional interpretation, but by a system allowing for simultaneous and 
parallel interpretation by the political branches and by the people. 
Although the court never acknowledged its own interpretive leaps, a 
general concern about illegality pervaded the opinion. Nagging questions 
underlie the court's formalism. What is the validity of the entire endeavor? 
What ensures the legitimacy of a constitutional court engaging in judicial 
review under an amended constitution in a transitional period? To what extent 
does a new constitutional system, and, as in Hungary, an entirely new 
30. F'ULLER, MORALITY, supra note 19, at 187. 
31. The Parliament's proposal in the Zetenyi Law was to generally respect the past regime's legal 
order, but to reopen cases wherever criminal laws had been applied in a politically discriminatory way. 
32. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. pt. III(4). 
33. Id. pt. III(3). 
246 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19: 239 
constitutional court, imply a moment of illegality, a glitch in the rule of law 
as the court has defined it? The Hungarian court addressed these concerns by 
clinging to the fiction that a state under the rule of law cannot be - and was 
not in the case of Hungary - created by undermining rule of law: 
The politically revolutionary changes adopted by the [October 1989] Constitution and the 
fundamental laws were all enacted in a procedurally impeccable manner, in full compliance 
with the old legal system's regulation of the power to legislate, thereby gaining their binding 
force.34 
The court thus dismissed questions about its own legitimacy. 
The Zetenyi case stands for the proposition that the authority to assess the 
legality of the prior regime does not lie with Parliament, but instead with the 
Constitutional Court. Perhaps this makes sense; after all, the Constitutional 
Court is an entirely new institution. New institutions carry with them the 
legitimacy of hope. In contrast, Parliament and the political process suffer 
from accumulated distrust. It is no wonder that there is fear of Parliament, 
when one considers the nature of its work in prior years: from 1980 to 1985, 
it met for a total of thirty-two days. In those thirty-two days, twenty-two acts 
were passed, with twenty-one of these unanimously approved. 35 Distrust of 
parliaments and politics is not particular to Hungary; it is pervasive in the 
region. Sadly, the distrust does not seem to be a function of post-changeover 
elections but seem to be more deeply, perhaps historically and institutionally, 
ingrained. 
Consider the following hypothetical: what if the question of legal 
continuity had arisen, not in the context of new legislation, but instead in the 
case of an individual defendant? Would Hungary's Constitutional Court have 
reached the same decision? Or might the court have articulated a principle 
allowing the revival of statutes of limitations in cases of grave crimes 
committed in the course of political persecution? Perhaps it might have based 
such a decision on a more substantive conception of the rule of law as the 
promise of equal justice under law, regardless of political affiliation. If the 
court had come to such a decision, then the Zetenyi case would be less about 
the rule of law than about institutional distrust. 36 
Already, Hungary's Parliament has responded to the court's decision with 
a law basing prosecutions on a pre-constitutional law that proscribed genocide 
without setting a statute oflimitations. Suppose the case returns to the court. 
What would be the result? Parliament has trapped the court in its adherence 
34. Id. pt. III(3). 
35. DONALD T. Fox & ANDREA BONIME-BLANC, HUNGARIAN CONSTITUfIONAL REFORM AND THB 
RULE OF LAW 30 (1993). 
36. Indeed, Justice S6!yom concedes as much: "The existence of the Constitutional Court during the 
transition thus allowed the transformation of political problems into legal questions that could be addressed 
with final, binding decisions.• Lasz16 S61yom, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Social Change, 
19 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 223 (1994). 
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to the norm of absolute legal continuity. Will the Constitutional Court now 
invoke a different theory of the rule of law? 
The transitional judges of Hungary, Germany, and other countries in the 
region have had to confront the difficulty of decisionmaking in uncertain 
times. Lacking a shared understanding of justice, burdened with what they 
interpret as the. intractable paradox of the "formal" versus the "just," the 
transitional judges can be expected to continue to have contradictory solutions 
to the ex post justice problem - solutions grounded in each state's historical 
and political circumstances. 

